Merton: Applications of Option-Pricing Theory (shameless self-promotion alert)…

Now that we have begun our study of the famous Black-Scholes-Merton option pricing formula, it’s time for me to shamelessly plug a journal article that I published early in my academic career which Robert C. Merton cites in his Nobel Prize lecture (Merton shared the Nobel Prize in economics in 1997 with Myron Scholes “for a new method to determine the value of derivatives”).

Here’s the citation (and link) to Merton’s lecture:

Merton, Robert C., 1998, Applications of Option-Pricing Theory: Twenty-Five Years Later, The American Economic Review, Vol. 88, No. 3 (Jun. 1998), pp. 323-349.

See page 337, footnote 11 of Merton’s paper for the reference to Neil A. Doherty and James R. Garven (1986)… (Doherty and I “pioneered” the application of a somewhat modified version of the Black-Scholes-Merton model to the pricing of insurance; thus Merton’s reference to our Journal of Finance paper in his Nobel Prize lecture)…

Federal Financial Guarantees: Problems and Solutions

Besides insuring bank and thrift deposits, the federal government guarantees a number of other financial transactions, including farm credits, home mortgages, student loans, small business loans, pensions, and export credits (to name a few).

In order to better understand the problems faced by federal financial guarantee programs, consider the conditions which give rise to a well-functioning private insurance market. In private markets, insurers segregate policyholders with similar exposures to risk into separate risk classifications, or pools. As long as the risks of the policyholders are not significantly correlated (that is, all policyholders do not suffer a loss at the same time), pooling reduces the risk of the average loss through the operation of a statistical principle known as the “law of large numbers”. Consequently, an insurer can cover its costs by charging a premium that is roughly proportional to the average loss. Such a premium is said to be actuarially fair.

By limiting membership in a risk pool to policyholders with similar risk exposures, the tendency of higher risk individuals to seek membership in the pool (commonly referred to as adverse selection) is controlled. This makes participation in a risk pool financially attractive to its members. Although an individual with a high chance of loss must consequently pay a higher premium than someone with a low chance of loss, both will insure if they are averse to risk and premiums are actuarially fair. By charging risk-sensitive premiums and limiting coverage through policy provisions such as deductibles, the tendency of individuals to seek greater exposure to risk once they have become insured (commonly referred to as moral hazard) is also controlled.

In contrast, federal financial guarantees often exaggerate the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. Premiums are typically based upon the average loss of a risk pool whose members’ risk exposures may vary greatly. This makes participation financially unattractive for low risk members who end up subsidizing high risk members if they remain in the pool. In order to prevent low risk members from leaving, the government’s typical response has been to make participation mandatory. However, various avenues exist by which low risk members can leave “mandatory” risk pools. For example, prior to the reorganization of the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) as part of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) during the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s and 1990s, a number of low risk thrifts became commercial banks. This change in corporate structure enabled these firms to switch insurance coverage to the FDIC, which at the time charged substantially lower premiums than did the FSLIC. Similarly, terminations of overfunded defined benefit pension plans enable firms to redeploy excess pension assets as well as drop out of the pension insurance pool operated by the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation (PBGC).

Although financial restructuring makes it possible to leave mandatory insurance pools, the costs of leaving may be sufficiently high for some low risk firms that they will remain. Unfortunately, the only way risk-insensitive insurance can possibly become a “good deal” for remaining members is by increasing exposure to risk; for example, by increasing the riskiness of investments or financial leverage. Furthermore, this problem is even more severe for high risk members of the pool, especially if they are financially distressed. The owners of these firms are entitled to all of the benefits of risky activities, while the insurance mechanism (in conjunction with limited liability if the firm is incorporated) minimizes the extent to which they must bear costs. Consequently, it is tempting to “go for broke” by making very risky investments which have substantial downside risk as well as potential for upside gain. The costs of this largely insurance-induced moral hazard problem can be staggering, both for the firm and the economy as a whole.

Ultimately, the key to restoring the financial viability of deposit insurance and other similarly troubled federal financial guarantee programs is to institute reforms which engender lower adverse selection and moral hazard costs. Policymakers would do well to consider how private insurers, who cannot rely upon taxpayer-financed bailouts, resolve these problems. The most common private market solution typically involves some combination of risk-sensitive premiums and economically meaningful limits on coverage. Federal financial guarantee programs should be similarly designed so that excessively risky behavior is penalized rather than rewarded.

On the economics of financial guarantees

On pp. 13-19 of the Derivatives Theory, part 3 lecture note and in Problem Set 9, we study how credit enhancement of risky debt works. Examples of credit enhancement in the real world include federal deposit insurance, public and private bond insurance, pension insurance, mortgage insurance, government loan guarantees, etc.; the list goes on.

Most credit enhancement schemes work in the fashion described below. Creditors loan money to “risky” borrowers who are at risk for defaulting on promised payments. Although borrowers promise to pay back \$B at t=1, they may default (in whole or in part) and the shortfall to creditors resembles a put option with t=1 payoff of -Max[0, B-F]. Therefore, without credit enhancement, the value of risky debt at t=0 is

$V(D) = B{e^{ - r}} - V(Max[0,B - F]).$

However, when credit risk is intermediated by a guarantor (e.g., an insurance company or government agency), credit risk gets transferred to the guarantor, who receives an upfront “premium” worth $V(Max[0,B - F])$ at t=0 in exchange for having to cover a shortfall of $Max[0,B - F]$ that may occur at t=1. If all credit risk is transferred to the guarantor (as shown in the graphic provided below), then from the creditors’ perspective it is as if the borrowers have issued riskless debt. Therefore, creditors charge borrowers the riskless rate of interest and are paid back what was promised from two sources: 1) borrowers pay $D = B - Max[0,B - F]$, and 2) the guarantor pays $Max[0,B - F]$.

Midterm 2 grade statistics for Finance 4335

I have posted midterm 2 exam grades to Canvas, and I will return your exam booklets to you during next Tuesday’s Finance 4335 class meeting. In the meantime, if you haven’t already done so, I highly recommend reviewing the exam solutions.

For the second midterm exam, here are the descriptive statistics:

 Average 77.8 Standard Deviation 18.41 Minimum 18 25th percentile 70 50th percentile 79.5 75th percentile 92 Maximum 100

Midterm exam 2 information…

Midterm 2 will be given during class on Thursday, November 2. This test consists of 4 problems. You are only required to complete 3 problems. At your option, you may complete all 4 problems, in which case I will throw out the problem on which you receive the lowest score.

The questions involve topics which we have covered since the first midterm exam. Topics covered include 1) demand for insurance, 2) moral hazard/adverse selection, 3) portfolio theory/capital market theory, and 4) financial derivatives (calls and puts specifically).

By the way, I have posted the formula sheet that I plan to use on the exam at the following location: http://fin4335.garven.com/fall2017/formulas_part2.pdf.

As I noted in my “Plans for next week in Finance 4335” blog posting, tomorrow’s class meeting will be devoted to a review session for midterm exam. If you haven’t already done so, I highly recommend that you review Problem Sets 5-8 and also try working the Sample Midterm 2 Exam (solutions are also provided) prior to coming to class tomorrow.

Plans for next week in Finance 4335

Our class meeting on Tuesday, October 31 will be devoted to a review session for the 2nd midterm exam which will take place during class on Thursday, November 2. I recommend that you review Problem Sets 5-8 and also try working the Sample Midterm 2 Exam (solutions are also provided) prior to coming to class on Tuesday so that we can have a productive discussion!